{"id":1506948,"date":"2025-05-30T12:33:35","date_gmt":"2025-05-30T11:33:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/?p=1506948"},"modified":"2025-05-30T12:33:35","modified_gmt":"2025-05-30T11:33:35","slug":"nous-avons-lu-pour-vous-6","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/nous-avons-lu-pour-vous-6\/","title":{"rendered":"Nous avons lu pour vous"},"content":{"rendered":"

JP Rodriguez Ruiz, Qiang Lin, Ch Lammens, PR Smeesters, S van Kleef-van Koeveringe, V Matheeussen, S Malhotra-Kumar. <\/b><\/p>\n

Increase in bloodstream infections caused by emm1 group A Streptococcus correlates with emergence of toxigenic M1<\/i><\/b>UK<\/i><\/b><\/span>, Belgium, May 2022 to August 2023.<\/i><\/b><\/h2>\n

Eurosurveillance, Vol 28, Issue 36, September 2023
<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

Many European countries have recently reported upsurges in invasive group A Streptococcus<\/i> (iGAS) infections mainly caused by emm<\/i>1 Streptococcus pyogenes<\/i> specifically the toxigenic M1UK<\/span> lineage. We present the epidemiology of emm<\/i>1 causing iGAS in Belgium during 2018\u2013August 2023 and describe an emergence of the toxigenic M1UK<\/span> lineage in Belgium in mid-2022 that was observed as an increase in bloodstream infections caused by emm<\/i>1 S. pyogenes<\/i> that continued into 2023.<\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.eurosurveillance.org\/docserver\/fulltext\/eurosurveillance\/28\/36\/eurosurv-28-36-3.pdf?expires=1731411465&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=A457DA98D76D38CCFC0A8304113901C8<\/p>\n


S van Kleef \u2013 van Koeveringe, Dr. S De Koster, prof. dr. V Matheeussen<\/b><\/p>\n

National reference centre for invasive <\/i><\/b>\u03b2<\/span>-hemolytic streptococci non group B. <\/i><\/b><\/h2>\n

Report 2012-2023\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

This report describes the activities performed by the National Reference Centre (NRC) for invasive <\/span>\u03b2<\/span>-hemolytic Streptococci non group B from 2012 until 2023, including species identification via MALDI-TOF MS, detection of virulence genes and\/or macrolide\/tetracycline resistance genes by Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) and emm typing using Sanger sequencing or WGS. This report aims to follow up on the epidemiological trends of invasive <\/span>\u03b2<\/span>-hemolytic streptococci over the past decade, highlighting changes in strain distribution, resistance patterns, and the emergence of new virulence factors. <\/span>Streptococcus pyogenes<\/i> (group A streptococcus, GAS) and Streptococcus dysgalactiae (groups C and G streptococci, GCS and GGS) are capable of causing a wide range of infections. These range from superficial infections such as pharyngitis and impetigo, to severe invasive infections like necrotizing fasciitis, bacteremia, and streptococcal toxic shock syndrome. Invasive infections are associated with significant morbidity and mortality, particularly in vulnerable populations.The virulence of these organisms is largely attributed to a variety of factors, including the M proteins (encoded by the emm or stG genes), which help the bacteria evade the immune system. Given the significant burden of invasive streptococcal infections, vaccine development has been a subject of interest, particularly targeting the M protein due to its role in pathogenesis and surface accessibility. Although no vaccine is currently available, ongoing research explores the potential for vaccine strategies to prevent infections by <\/span>S. pyogenes<\/i> and <\/span>S. dysgalactiae<\/i>..<\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.sciensano.be\/sites\/default\/files\/report_2012-2023_streptococci_v1.0.pdf<\/span><\/p>\n


L Cornelissen\u00a0 <\/span>S van Kleef-van Koeveringen , V Matheeussen <\/b><\/p>\n

Surveillance \u00e9pid\u00e9miologique des infections invasives caus\u00e9es par les streptocoques du groupe A S. pyogenes – 2017 \u00e0 2023 <\/i><\/b><\/h2>\n

Sciensano, rapport \u00e9pid\u00e9miologique 2017-2023, infections invasives caus\u00e9es par les streptocoques du groupe A<\/b><\/p>\n

Messages cl\u00e9s: <\/span><\/p>\n

\u2022 Toutes les sources de donn\u00e9es (laboratoires vigies, Centre National de R\u00e9f\u00e9rence et d\u00e9claration obligatoires) indiquent les m\u00eames tendances g\u00e9n\u00e9rales : la fr\u00e9quence de l\u2019iGAS a \u00e9t\u00e9 faible pendant les ann\u00e9es pand\u00e9miques 2020-2021 et a fortement augment\u00e9 \u00e0 partir de la fin de 2022, avec des chiffres tr\u00e8s \u00e9lev\u00e9s en 2023.
<\/span>\u2022 Le pic du nombre de cas signal\u00e9s a \u00e9t\u00e9 atteint au tournant de l\u2019ann\u00e9e 2022-2023 : d\u00e9cembre \u201822 selon les chiffres du Centre national de r\u00e9f\u00e9rence (CNR) et les laboratoires vigies, janvier \u201823 selon les chiffres de la d\u00e9claration obligatoire (DO).
\u2022 Il est difficile de d\u00e9terminer l\u2019ampleur exacte de l\u2019augmentation relative par rapport aux ann\u00e9es pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes en raison des limites des diff\u00e9rentes sources de donn\u00e9es.
\u2022 Le g\u00e9notype le plus courant pendant le pic 2022-2023 \u00e9tait M1.
<\/span>\u2022 On ne sait pas exactement ce qui a provoqu\u00e9 ce pic, mais il est probable qu\u2019une combinaison de facteurs joue un r\u00f4le : une faible circulation pendant la pand\u00e9mie entra\u00eenant une r\u00e9duction de l\u2019immunit\u00e9 chez les jeunes enfants, une augmentation soudaine des contacts \u00e9troits et des autres infections virales (qui sont un facteur de risque pour l\u2019iGAS) apr\u00e8s la lev\u00e9e des mesures d\u2019hygi\u00e8ne, et peut-\u00eatre aussi un g\u00e9notype plus virulent.
<\/span>\u2022 Les groupes d\u2019\u00e2ge les plus touch\u00e9s sont les enfants de moins de 5 ans et les adultes de plus de 65 ans.
<\/span>\u2022 Il s\u2019agit d\u2019infections graves qui n\u00e9cessitent presque toujours une hospitalisation et sont associ\u00e9es \u00e0 une mortalit\u00e9 \u00e9lev\u00e9e. Toutefois, les chiffres exacts relatifs \u00e0 la mortalit\u00e9 ne sont pas disponibles en raison de probl\u00e8mes d\u2019encodage des donn\u00e9es (pour les certificats de d\u00e9c\u00e8s et les donn\u00e9es du R\u00e9sum\u00e9 Hospitalier Minimal), de l\u2019enregistrement au moment de l\u2019infection aigu\u00eb, sans suivi dans le temps (donn\u00e9es du CNR), ou d\u2019une couverture limit\u00e9e (d\u00e9claration obligatoire).<\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.sciensano.be\/en\/health-topics\/invasive-group-a-streptococcal-infection#prevention<\/span><\/p>\n


Nicolas Yin, Charlotte Michel, Nadia Makki, Ariane Deplano, Alisha Milis, Benoit Prevost, Veronique Yvette Miendje-Deyi, Marie Hallin, Delphine Martiny, National reference centre for Staphylococcus aureus<\/i>.<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

Emergence and spread of a mupirocin-resistant variant of the European epidemic fusidic acid-resistant impetigo clone of Staphylococcus aureus, Belgium, 2013 to 2023<\/i><\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n

Eurosurveillance, 29, 19, May 2024<\/b><\/p>\n

Background
<\/b>Antimicrobial resistance to mupirocin and fusidic acid, which are used for treatment of skin infections caused by Staphylococcus aureus<\/i>, is of concern.<\/p>\n

Aim
<\/b>To investigate resistance to fusidic acid and mupirocin in meticillin-susceptible S. aureus<\/i> (MSSA) from community-acquired skin and soft tissue infections (SSTIs) in Belgium.<\/p>\n

Methods
<\/b>We collected 2013\u20132023 data on fusidic acid and mupirocin resistance in SSTI-associated MSSA from two large Belgian laboratories. Resistant MSSA isolates sent to the Belgian Staphylococci Reference Centre were spa-typed and analysed for the presence of the eta and etb virulence genes and the mupA resistance gene. In addition, we whole genome sequenced MSSA isolates collected between October 2021 and September 2023.<\/p>\n

Results
<\/b>Mupirocin resistance increased between 2013 and 2023 from 0.5-1.5% to 1.7-5.6%. Between 2018 and 2023, 91.4% (64\/70) of mupirocin-resistant isolates were co-resistant to fusidic acid. By September 2023, between 8.9% (15\/168) and 10.1% (11\/109) of children isolates from the two laboratories were co-resistant. Of the 33 sequenced isolates, 29 were sequence type 121, clonal and more distantly related to the European epidemic fusidic acid-resistant impetigo clone (EEFIC) observed in Belgium in 2020. These isolates carried the mupA and fusB genes conferring resistance to mupirocin and fusidic acid, respectively, and the eta and etb virulence genes.<\/p>\n

Conclusion
<\/b>We highlight the spread of a mupirocinresistant EEFIC in children, with a seasonal trend for the third quarter of the year. This is of concern because this variant is resistant to the two main topical antibiotics used to treat impetigo in Belgium.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

Ariane Deplano, Marie Hallin, Natalia Bustos Sierra, Charlotte Michel, , Benoit Prevos, Delphine Martiny and Nicolas Yin<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

Persistence of the Staphylococcus aureus epidemic European fusidic acid-resistant impetigo clone (EEFIC) in Belgium.<\/i><\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n

J Antimicrob Chemother 2023; 78: 2061\u20132065<\/b><\/p>\n

Objectives
<\/b>In August 2018, a public health alert was issued in Belgium regarding clusters of impetigo cases caused by the epidemic European fusidic acid-resistant impetigo clone (EEFIC) of <\/span>Staphylococcus aureus<\/i>. As a result, the Belgian national reference centre (NRC) was commissioned to update the epidemiology of S. aureus causing community-onset skin and soft tissues infection (CO-SSTI) to assess the proportion of EEFIC among them.<\/span><\/p>\n

Methods
<\/b>For 1 year, Belgian clinical laboratories were asked to send their first three <\/span>S. aureus<\/i> isolated from CO-SSTI each month. Isolates were tested for antimicrobial susceptibility to oxacillin, mupirocin and fusidic acid.
<\/span>Resistant isolates were also spa typed and tested for the presence of the genes encoding the Panton\u2013Valentine leucocidin, the toxic shock syndrome toxin and the exfoliatins A and B. MLST clonal complexes werededuced from the spa types.<\/span><\/p>\n

Results
<\/b>Among the 518 <\/span>S. aureus<\/i> strains analysed, 487 (94.0%) were susceptible to oxacillin. Of these, 79(16.2%) were resistant to fusidic acid, of which 38 (48.1%) belonged to the EEFIC. EEFIC isolates were mostlyisolated from young patients with impetigo and showed a seasonal late summer peak.<\/span><\/p>\n

Conclusions
<\/b>These results suggest the persistence of EEFIC in Belgium. Furthermore, its prevalence may lead toreconsideration of the treatment guidelines for impetigo.
<\/span>The primary risk assessment of the RAG (risk assessment group) concerning a cluster of fusidic acid-resistant <\/span>Staphylococcus aureus<\/i> in Flanders (Turnhout) can be found on the Sciensano website through the following link : <\/span>https:\/\/www.sciensano.be\/sites\/default\/files\/pra_impetigo_09042019_v2.1_1.pdf<\/span><\/p>\n

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JP Rodriguez Ruiz, Qiang Lin, Ch Lammens, PR Smeesters, S van Kleef-van Koeveringe, V Matheeussen, S Malhotra-Kumar. Increase in bloodstream infections caused by emm1 group A Streptococcus correlates with emergence of toxigenic M1UK, Belgium, May 2022 to August 2023. Eurosurveillance, Vol 28, Issue 36, September 2023 Many European countries have recently reported upsurges in invasive […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":202,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[115],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1506948","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-115"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1506948","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1506948"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1506948\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1506965,"href":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1506948\/revisions\/1506965"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/202"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1506948"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1506948"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nosoinfo.be\/nosoinfos\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1506948"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}